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) O R D ER
)
CO U N TY  OF CU M BERLA N D , BO A R D  )
OF CO M M ISSIO N ER S, N O R T H  )
CA R O LIN A  and JA M ES M A R TIN , )
JA M ES LA W SO N , TO M A S LLO Y D  )
and R ICH A R D  H EICK SEN , )
IN D IV ID U A LLY , )
)
D efendants. )
This m atter is before the court on the 9 D ecem ber 2010 m otion to  dism iss filed by 
defendants Cum berland County (“ County”), Cum berland County B oard o f  Com m issioners 
(“B oard”),1 Jam es M artin  (“M artin”), Jam es Law son (“L aw son”), Tom as L loyd (“L loyd”), and 
R ichard  H eicksen (“H eicksen”).2 The m otion has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.
I. BACKGROUND
P la in tiff  A lvin L. B ess (“plaintiff”) w as em ployed as a transportation planner by the 
Fayetteville A rea M etropolitan Planning O rganization (“FA M PO ”), w hich is housed in the
1 Plaintiff lists “County of Cumberland, Board of Commissioners, North Carolina” as a defendant in the 
caption of his complaint, thereby appearing to refer to only one entity. However, the allegations in the body of the 
complaint demonstrate plaintiff’s intention to treat the County and the Board as separate defendants. (See, e.g., 
Compl., DE # 5, mi 20, 28, 35, 42, 158, 173, 175.) Furthermore, the County and the Board are individually named in 
each count of plaintiff’s complaint. Thus, for the purposes of this motion, the court will treat the County and the 
Board as separate and distinct defendants.
2
For the sake of convenience, Martin, Lawson, Lloyd, and Heicksen may be referred to collectively as the 
“individual defendants.”
Cum berland County P lanning and Inspections D epartm ent, from  3 M arch 2008 until his 
term ination on 12 M arch 2010. (Com pl., D E  # 5, ^  6, 13, 21, 32, 133; D efs.’ M em. Supp. M ot. 
D ism iss, D E  # 12, at 2.) P la in tiff filed tw o charges o f  discrim ination w ith the Equal 
Em ploym ent O pportunity Com m ission (“E E O C ”) on 26 January 20 1 03 and 19 M ay 2010. (Id. 
^  13-14, 18, 111, 153, 178.) On 20 O ctober 2010, p lain tiff com m enced this action by filing a 
m otion to  proceed in fo rm a  pauperis, and he attached his com plaint to  the motion. H e asserts 
claim s under Title V II o f  the Civil R ights A ct o f  1964 (“Title V II”), the A m ericans w ith 
D isabilities A ct o f  1990 (“A D A ”), and the A ge D iscrim ination in Em ploym ent A ct (“A D EA ”). 
P la in tiff also appears to  assert num erous state law  claim s against the defendants.
On 9 D ecem ber 2010, all o f  the defendants filed a jo in t m otion to dism iss the complaint. 
P la in tiff filed a response on 15 D ecem ber 2010. N one o f  the defendants filed a reply.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Federal Claim s A gainst the Individual D efendants and the B oard
The individual defendants contend that all o f  the federal claim s that have been brought 
against them  should be dism issed because there is no individual liability under Title VII, the 
ADA, or the ADEA. The court agrees that p la in tiff cannot m aintain any o f  his federal claims 
against M artin, Law son, L loyd, and H eicksen in their individual capacities. See Jones v. 
Sternheim er, 387 Fed. Appx. 366, 368 (4th Cir. 2010) (Title VII, the ADA, and the A D EA  “do 
not provide for causes o f  action against defendants in their individual capacities.”); B aird  v.
3
The court notes that in one paragraph of his complaint, plaintiff states that he filed his first charge of 
discrimination on 13 November 2009. (Compl. ^ 107.) However, in every other instance where the filing date of the 
first charge is mentioned in the complaint, it is listed as being filed on 26 January 2010. (See id. ^  13, 111, 178.) 
This discrepancy is not material to the issues currently before the court. The court may revisit this issue in future 
proceedings if it becomes necessary.
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Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 472 (4th Cir. 1999); L issau v. S. Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180-81 (4th
Cir. 1998); B irkbeck v. M arvel L ighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 510-11 (4th Cir. 1994); W ard v. 
Coastal Carolina H ealth  Care, P.A ., 597 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570 (E.D.N .C. 2009) (“ [I]ndividual 
em ployees o f  corporate entities . . . are not liable in their individual capacities for T itle VII 
violations because such individuals are not ‘em ployers’ under Title V II.”). Therefore, the court 
will dism iss all o f  the federal claim s asserted against the individual defendants in this case.
The court will also dism iss all o f  the federal claim s that have been brought against the 
Board. The B oard does not appear to  be plaintiff’ s “em ployer” w ithin the m eaning o f  the 
relevant statutes, and p lain tiff m akes no allegations in his com plaint to  suggest that the Board 
w as his actual em ployer. M ore im portantly, under N orth Carolina law, county entities such as 
departm ents, agencies, and boards lack the capacity to  be sued. See A very v. Cnty. o f  Burke, 
660 F.2d 111, 113-14 (4th Cir. 1981) (noting that state law  dictates w hether a governm ental 
agency has the capacity to  be sued in federal court). N orth  Carolina General Statutes § 153A-11 
acknow ledges that a county is a legal entity w hich m ay be sued. H ow ever, there is no 
corresponding statute authorizing suit against a N orth  Carolina county’s B oard o f 
Com m issioners. See Craig v. Cnty. o f  Chatham , 545 S.E.2d 455, 456 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) 
(noting that the county’s B oard o f  H ealth  and B oard o f  Com m issioners “are not entities capable 
o f  being sued”), aff’ d in part, rev ’d in part on other grounds, 565 S.E.2d 172 (N.C. 2002); P iland 
v. H ertford Cnty. Bd. o f  C om m ’rs, 539 S.E.2d 669, 671 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that 
county B oard o f  Com m issioners w as no t a proper party to  be sued).
As a result, the only defendant rem aining w ith respect to  plaintiff’ s federal claim s is the 
County, w ho w as plaintiff’ s em ployer for the purposes o f  T itle VII, the AD A, and the ADEA.
3
(See, e.g., Compl. ^  6-10, 21.)
B. C ounty’s M otion to  D ism iss for Lack o f  Personal Jurisdiction
The County m oves to  dism iss for lack o f  personal ju risd iction  under Federal R ule o f 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) because it claim s that it has never been served w ith a sum m ons in this 
case. A lthough p lain tiff did serve a sum m ons on County M anager M artin, the County m aintains 
that the sum m ons w as directed to  M artin  in his individual capacity and not in his official 
capacity as an agent for the County. Once service o f  process has been challenged, “ [t]he 
p lain tiff bears the burden o f  establishing that the service o f  process has been perform ed in 
accordance w ith the requirem ents o f  Federal R ule o f  Civil P rocedure 4 .” M cC reary v. V aughan- 
B assett Furniture Co., 412 F. Supp. 2d 535, 537 (M .D.N.C. 2005).
The C ounty’s argum ent is w ithout merit. First, the County adm its that M artin  is a proper 
official upon w hom  service m ay be m ade on beh a lf o f  the County pursuant to  N orth C arolina 
R ule o f  Civil Procedure 4(j)(5)b. (See D efs.’ M em . Supp. M ot. D ism iss at 4.) Furtherm ore, 
even i f  the court accepts the C ounty’s argum ent that the sum m ons w as directed to  M artin  in his 
individual capacity, w hen service o f  process gives a defendant actual notice o f  the pending 
action, the courts m ay construe the Federal R ules o f  Civil P rocedure liberally “to  effectuate 
service and uphold the ju risd iction  o f  the court, thus insuring the opportunity for a trial on the 
m erits.” K arlsson v. Rabinow itz, 318 F.2d 666, 668 (4th Cir. 1963); see also Arm co, Inc. v. 
Penrod-S tauffer Bldg. Sys., Inc., 733 F.2d 1087, 1089 (4th Cir. 1984). Here, the County does 
not deny that it had notice o f  this action, nor does it identify any prejudice that has arisen from  
any alleged technical defect in service. See M cCreary, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 537. “M oreover, the 
court should allow  a p ro  se litigant a certain am ount o f  lenity that is not afforded to  represented
4
parties.” Id . The court concludes that dism issal for lack o f  personal ju risd iction  due to 
insufficiency o f  service o f  process is not w arranted under these circum stances.
C. Title V II R ace Claim s A gainst the County
In this case, p lain tiff asserts Title V II claim s for “ retaliatory discrim ination and race 
discrim ination.” (Compl. ^  5, 111; see also id. ^  107, 200-01, 203.) The County m oves to 
dism iss these claim s pursuant to  Federal R ule o f  Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). A  m otion to  dism iss 
pursuant to  R ule 12(b)(6) “tests the sufficiency o f  a com plaint” but “does not resolve contests 
surrounding the facts, the m erits o f  a claim, or the applicability o f  defenses.” R epublican Party 
v. M artin, 980 F .2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). In order to  survive a R ule 12(b)(6) m otion to 
dism iss, the com plaint m ust contain “ sufficient factual m atter, accepted as true, to  ‘state a claim  
to re lief that is plausible on its face .’” A shcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Tw om bly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A  claim  has facial plausibility w hen 
the p lain tiff pleads factual content that allows the court to  draw  the reasonable inference that the 
defendant is liable for the m isconduct alleged.” Id . In evaluating w hether a claim  is stated,
“ [the] court accepts all w ell-p led  facts as true and construes these facts in the light m ost 
favorable to the p lain tiff in w eighing the legal sufficiency o f  the com plaint.” N em et Chevrolet, 
Ltd. v. Consum eraffairs.com . Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009). A  court need not accept as 
true “ ‘unw arranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or argum ents.’” Id . (quoting W ahi v. 
Charleston A rea M ed. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 615 n.26 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 
1140 (2010)).
P la in tiff is proceeding p ro  se. P leadings drafted by a p ro  se litigant are held to  a less 
stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. See H aines v. K erner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
5
(1972). This court is charged w ith liberally construing a pleading filed by a p ro  se litigant to 
allow  for the developm ent o f  a potentially  m eritorious claim. See id .; N oble v. Barnett. 24 F.3d 
582, 587 n.6 (4th Cir. 1994); G ordon v. Leeke. 574 F.2d 1147. 1151 (4th Cir. 1978).
T itle VII prohibits an em ployer from  “d isch arg in g ] any individual. or otherw ise . . . 
d isc rim ina ting ] against any individual w ith respect to  his com pensation. term s. conditions. or 
privileges o f  em ploym ent. because o f  such ind iv idual’s race . . . .” 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
A bsent direct evidence. the elem ents o f  a prim a facie case o f  discrim ination under Title V II are: 
(1) m em bership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job  perform ance; (3) adverse em ploym ent 
action; and (4) different treatm ent from  sim ilarly situated em ployees outside the protected class. 
See Colem an v. M d. Ct. o f  Appeals. 626 F.3d 187. 190 (4th Cir. 2010) (applying these elem ents 
in the R ule 12(b)(6) context). cert. granted. 79 U .S.L.W . 3480 (U.S. June 27. 2011) (No. 10­
1016); W hite v. B FI W aste Servs.. LLC. 375 F.3d 288. 295 (4th Cir. 2004).
“ [U ]nder Title VII. a p la in tiff can only seek redress for discrim inatory acts that occurred 
w ithin 180 days prior to  the filing o f  the EEO C charge.” B arb ier v. D urham  Cnty. Bd. o f  Educ.. 
225 F. Supp. 2d 617. 624 (M .D.N.C. 2002); see also Tinsley v. F irst U nion N a t’l Bank. 155 F.3d 
435. 439 (4th Cir. 1998). abrogated on other grounds. N a t’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. M organ.
536 U.S. 101 (2002); 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). The County argues that plaintiff’ s “ram bling 
allegations in his com plaint” detail a m ultitude o f  alleged discrim inatory actions that took place 
outside o f  the relevant 180-day tim e period and that none o f  these actions m ay be considered by 
the court in determ ining the sufficiency o f  plaintiff’ s race discrim ination claim .4 (D efs.’ M em. 4
4 The County asserts that the only allegations that fall within the 180-day period relate either to plaintiffs 
discharge or to “reprimands and negative performance evaluations[. which.] standing alone. do not constitute an 
adverse employment action.” (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 16.)
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Supp. M ot. D ism iss at 9.) The County further m aintains that plaintiff’ s race discrim ination claim  
should be dism issed because the “ com plaint contains no allegations to  establish that he was 
subjected to  discrim inatory personnel actions w hich resulted in his disparate treatm ent . . . .” (Id. 
at 17.)
The court rejects the C ounty’s argum ent w ith respect to  this issue. H ere, plaintiff, w ho is 
A frican-A m erican, argues that he w as discrim inated against on the basis o f  his race in the 
assignm ent o f  job  responsibilities.5 Specifically, he m aintains that he becam e “invisible” at w ork 
after he w as “ excluded from  FA M PO  projects, stripped o f  his previous planning duties, excluded 
from  m aking any oral presentations at FA M PO  quarterly m eetings and not assigned current or 
future planning duties[.]” (Com pl. ^ 53.) H e further alleges that H eicksen divided his job  
responsibilities betw een tw o new  w hite transportation planners. (Id.) A lthough these allegations 
are m inim al, they are sufficient to  dem onstrate that p la in tiff w as treated differently from  
sim ilarly situated em ployees outside the protected class. C f  Phillips v. D ow  Jones & Co., No.
04 Civ. 5178(DAB), 2009 W L 2568437, at *12 (S.D .N .Y . Aug. 17, 2009) (court considered 
allegations that defendant transferred A frican-A m erican plaintiff’ s job  responsibilities to  a w hite 
em ployee upon plaintiff’ s tem porary m edical leave and that p lain tiff w as not assigned a defined 
job  upon her return from  leave in determ ining that p lain tiff had raised an inference o f  racial 
discrim ination).
Furtherm ore, w hile p lain tiff alleges that H eicksen began to  reassign his job  duties on 19 5
5 The court notes that it is possible for the reassignment of job duties to constitute an adverse employment 
action “if the plaintiff can show that the reassignment had some significant detrimental effect” such as a “decrease in 
compensation, job title, level of responsibility, or opportunity for promotion[.]” James v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, 
Inc., 368 F.3d 371, 376 (4th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Webster v. Rumsfeld, 156 Fed. Appx. 571, 579 (4th Cir. 2005). In this case, plaintiff has set forth sufficient 
allegations regarding the significant change in his level of responsibility to survive the motion to dismiss.
7
D ecem ber 2008 (Com pl. ^ 51), a date w hich is clearly outside o f  the 180-day lim itations period,
he also alleges that discrim inatory actions w ere taken w ithin the relevant tim e period. For
exam ple, he specifically states that he “w as no longer perm itted or given a project to  m ake
presentations at quarterly m eetings in January, April, July and O ctober 2009, or in January
2010.” (Id. ^  52.) Thus, regardless o f  w hether p la in tiff is seeking recovery under continuing
violation principles or is seeking recovery for independent and separate instances o f  alleged
discrim ination, he has in fact alleged that some discrim inatory conduct occurred w ithin 180 days
prior to  the filing o f  the first EEO C charge.6 As a result, p la in tiff will be perm itted to proceed
w ith his race discrim ination claim  against the County.
P la in tiff also asserts a Title V II race retaliation claim  w ith respect to  the term ination o f
his em ploym ent. Title V II’s prohibition on retaliation states:
It shall be an unlaw ful em ploym ent practice for an em ployer to  discrim inate 
against any o f  his em ployees . . . because he has opposed any practice m ade an 
unlaw ful em ploym ent practice by this subchapter, or because he has m ade a 
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any m anner in an investigation, 
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
42 U .S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The elem ents o f  a prim a facie retaliation claim  under Title V II are: (1) 
engagem ent in a protected activity; (2) adverse em ploym ent action; and (3) a causal link  betw een 
the protected activity and the em ploym ent action. Colem an, 626 F.3d at 190 (applying these 
elem ents in the R ule 12(b)(6) context); Price v. Thom pson, 380 F .3d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 2004);
6 The court recognizes that the decision of the United States Supreme Court in National Railroad Passenger 
Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113-15 (2002), has curtailed the use of the continuing violations doctrine. However, 
“the availability of the doctrine, as a matter of law, is not foreclosed by Morgan . . . .” Branch v. Guilderland Cent. 
Sch. Dist., 239 F. Supp. 2d 242, 254-55 (N.D.N.Y. 2003); see also, e.g., O’Bar v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs. Inc., No. 5:04- 
CV-00019-W, 2007 WL 604711, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 22, 2007). Furthermore, even if the acts that plaintiff 
complains of are considered to be separate and discrete acts of discrimination, any acts occurring prior to the 180- 
day limitations period could still be used as “background evidence in support of a timely claim.” Morgan, 536 U.S. 
at 113.
8
M cN airn v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 974, 980 (4th Cir. 1991).
The County adm its that the first tw o elem ents o f  this claim  have been satisfactorily pled. 
(See D efs .’ M em. Supp. M ot. D ism iss at 15.) The County argues that p lain tiff has failed to 
m ake sufficient allegations regarding the th ird  elem ent o f  his prim a facie case, that is, to  allege 
adequate facts to  dem onstrate a causal connection betw een his discharge and the protected 
expression. B ecause o f  this deficiency, the County m aintains that p lain tiff’s retaliation claim  
should be dism issed for failure to  state a claim  upon w hich re lief m ay be granted. How ever, 
“under Fourth C ircuit law, very little p roo f is required to  establish the causal link  in a retaliation 
case; in fact, in m any instances, the connection is inferred from  the m ere act o f  term ination . . . .” 
Barbier, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 627; see also M cN airn, 929 F .2d at 980 (stating, in reference to  the 
causal connection elem ent o f a retaliation case, that “it can be inferred that the term ination was 
triggered by the [protected activity]”); K arpel v. Inova H ealth  Sys. Servs., 134 F .3d 1222, 1229 
(4th Cir. 1998) (“A lthough K arpel presents little or no direct evidence o f  a causal connection 
betw een her protected activity and Inova’s adverse action, little is required .”).
A ccordingly, p la in tiff will be allow ed to  proceed w ith his Title V II race retaliation claim  
against the County.
D. A D A  and A D EA  Claim s A gainst the County
1. Failure to  E xhaust A dm inistrative R em edies
The County argues that p laintiff’s A D A  and A D EA  claim s should be dism issed because 
p lain tiff failed to exhaust his adm inistrative rem edies. B efore a p lain tiff m ay file suit under the 
A D A  or the AD EA, he is required to  file a charge o f  discrim ination w ith the EEO C. See 29 
U .S.C. § 626(d); 42 U .S.C. § 12117(a) (incorporating the “powers, rem edies, and procedures” o f
9
Title VII, including exhaustion requirem ent); Jones v. C alvert Grp., Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 300 (4th
Cir. 2009); D avis v. Va. Com m onw ealth Univ., 180 F.3d 626, 628 n.3 (4th Cir. 1999).
“Th[is] exhaustion requirem ent ensures that the em ployer is put on notice o f  the alleged 
violations so that the m atter can be resolved out o f  court i f  possible.” M iles v. Dell, Inc., 429 
F.3d 480, 491 (4th Cir. 2005). Im portantly, a failure by the p lain tiff to  exhaust adm inistrative 
rem edies concerning a discrim ination claim  deprives the federal courts o f  subject m atter 
ju risd iction  over the claim. See Jones, 551 F .3d at 300.
The scope o f  a plaintiff’ s right to  file a federal law suit under the A D A  or the A D EA  is 
determ ined by the contents o f  the EEO C charge. Id. Only those discrim ination claim s stated in 
the initial charge, those reasonably related to  the initial charge, and those developed by 
reasonable investigation o f  the initial charge m ay be m aintained in a subsequent civil action. Id.; 
see also Evans v. Techs. A pplications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 963 (4th Cir. 1996).
Here, p la in tiff asserts that he filed tw o separate charges o f  discrim ination w ith the EEOC. 
H e states that he “ signed and returned the first EEO C com plaint on January 26, 2010 and signed 
and returned a second EEO C  com plaint on M ay 19, 2010.” (Com pl. ^ 13; see also id. ^  111, 
153, 178.) H e further alleges that on 15 M arch 2010 (i.e., after he filed the first charge o f 
discrim ination but before he filed the second charge), he notified the EEO C that his em ploym ent 
had been term inated. (Id . ^ 135.) A t that tim e, he allegedly “ added” to  the first discrim ination 
charge, bu t plaintiff’ s com plaint does not specifically describe w hat the additions were. (Id.) 
U nfortunately, p la in tiff has not provided the court w ith a copy o f  either one o f  the EEO C charges 
that he filed.
P la in tiff identifies his first EEO C  com plaint as Charge # 433-2010-00355, and he asserts
10
that the basis o f  the first charge w as “retaliatory discrim ination and race discrim ination.” (Id. ^
111.) H e identifies the second EEO C com plaint as Charge # 433-2010-01801. (Id . ^  153.) He 
states that the second charge contained “corrections that included” “Title V II o f  the Civil R ights 
A ct o f  1964” ; “The A ge D iscrim ination in Em ploym ent A ct” ; “The A m ericans w ith D isabilities 
A ct” ; “D iscrim ination based on Race, color, retaliation, and disability” ; “R etaliation by Mr. 
M artin, M r. Law son, M r. L loyd and M r. H eicksen” ; and “C ontinuing action (retaliation):
January 6, 2010 to  April 22, 2010.” (Id.)
A lthough p lain tiff allegedly filed tw o separate charges o f  discrim ination, he has attached 
only one right-to-sue letter to  his com plaint. (Com pl., Ex. A, D E  # 5-2, at 2.) The letter 
specifically indicates that it w as issued in relation to  plaintiff’ s first charge o f  discrim ination, 
Charge # 433-2010-00355. (Id.) The right-to-sue letter w as accom panied by a cover letter from  
EEO C Investigator N ancy L. Chapm an w hich states in part that “ [t]he evidence obtained by the 
Com m ission indicates that there is insufficient evidence to  support that the Respondent 
discrim inated against you because o f  your race in v iolation o f  Title VII o f  the Civil R ights A ct o f 
1964, as am ended.” (Id . at 1.) The cover letter does not reference any claim s m ade pursuant to 
the A D A  or the ADEA. M oreover, p lain tiff does not allege that the A D A  and A D EA  claim s 
w ere included in his first charge, either w hen he filed it initially or w hen he am ended it on 15 
M arch 2010.7
7
In his response to the motion to dismiss, plaintiff states that his “[c]laims under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) against the Defendants were 
included to some degree by the Plaintiff in the amended EEOC complaint because the claims under the ADA and the 
ADEA were made known to the Defendants in January 2010.” (Pl.’s Resp. Mot. Dismiss, DE # 14, at 3.) However, 
even if the ADA and ADEA charges were made known to the defendants, plaintiff’s statement is insufficient to 
show that these claims were actually presented to the EEOC for possible resolution. Thus, plaintiff’s statement is 
also insufficient to show that he exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to his ADA and ADEA claims. 
See EEOC v. Am. Nat’l Bank, 652 F.2d 1176, 1185 (4th Cir. 1981) (The charging requirement serves two important 
purposes: “first, the employer is fully notified of the violation alleged by the charging party; and second, the EEOC
11
The foregoing analysis leads the court to conclude that plaintiff’s ADA and ADEA
claim s w ere only included as a part o f  the second charge. H ow ever, p la in tiff has not alleged that 
he ever received, or w as eligible to  receive, a right-to-sue letter w ith respect to  the second 
charge. See D avis v. N .C . D ep ’t o f  Corr., 48 F.3d 134, 140 (4th Cir. 1995) (“W e have long held 
that receipt of, or at least entitlem ent to, a right-to-sue letter is a jurisdictional prerequisite that 
m ust be alleged in a plaintiff’s com plaint.”). In fact, p la in tiff has com pletely failed to  plead that 
he exhausted his adm inistrative rem edies w ith respect to the A D A  and A D EA  claims. He 
specifically states in his com plaint that he “has filed 2 EEO C com plaints against the County and 
brings this action pursuant Itol the first com plaint’s R ight to  sue letter generated by the EEO C  on 
July 23, 2010.” (Com pl. ^ 14 (em phasis added); see also id. ^  178-79.) B ecause p lain tiff has 
failed to  subm it an EEO C  right-to-sue letter w ith respect to  the second charge and has otherw ise 
failed to  allege any facts supporting a jurisdictional foundation for his A D A  and A D EA  claims, 
these claim s are subject to  dism issal. See Davis, 48 F.3d at 140 (“Thus, w here ‘[n]either the 
com plaint nor the am ended com plaint a lleges’ that the p lain tiff has ‘com plied w ith these 
prerequisites,’ the p lain tiff has not ‘properly invoked the court’s ju risd iction  . . . .’” (alteration in 
original) (citation om itted)); Sim m ons-B lount v. G uilford Cnty. Bd. o f  Educ., No. 1:06-CV-944, 
2009 W L 962266, at *3 (M .D .N .C. Apr. 7, 2009) (holding that plaintiff’ s failure to  allege 
exhaustion o f  adm inistrative rem edies w as not fatal w here she attached the right-to-sue letter to 
her com plaint).8 A ccordingly, the court concludes that it does not have subject m atter
has the opportunity to consider all the charges and to attempt their resolution through conciliation and voluntary 
compliance.”).
8
The court also notes that there is no indication that the ADA and ADEA claims are reasonably related to 
the Title VII race claims raised by plaintiff in his first charge of discrimination. See, e.g., Jones, 551 F.3d at 300 
(“[A] claim in formal litigation will generally be barred if the EEOC charge alleges discrimination on one basis, such
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2. Failure to  State a Claim
A lternatively, even i f  the court had subject m atter ju risd iction  over plaintiff’ s A D EA
claim, it should still be dism issed because p lain tiff has failed to  state any claim  upon w hich re lief
m ay be granted. The A D EA  claim  fails to  m eet the requisite pleading and plausibility
requirem ents set forth in Tw om bly, 550 U.S. 544, and Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937. A lthough p lain tiff
alleges that his job  responsibilities w ere reassigned to  tw o younger w hite em ployees (Com pl. ^
51, 53, 221), he com pletely fails to  m ake any allegations regarding his age or a birth  date from
w hich his age m ay be determ ined. Thus, the court agrees w ith the County’ s argum ent that
“ [p]lain tiff has not . . . pled any facts to establish that he is w ithin the class o f  em ployees
protected by the A ge D iscrim ination in Em ploym ent A ct.” (D efs.’ M em. Supp. M ot. D ism iss at
16.) As a result, p la in tiff has failed to  state an A D EA  claim.
Furtherm ore, plaintiff’ s discrim ination and hostile w ork  environm ent claim s under the
A D A  w ould also be dism issed even if  p lain tiff had exhausted his adm inistrative rem edies w ith
respect to  these claims. The A D A  provides in relevant part:
N o covered entity shall discrim inate against a qualified individual on the basis o f 
disability in regard to  job  application procedures, the hiring, advancem ent, or 
discharge o f  em ployees, em ployee com pensation, job  training, and other term s, 
conditions, and privileges o f  employm ent.
42 U .S.C. § 12112(a). To avail h im self o f  the protections o f  the ADA, p lain tiff m ust first
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s ADA and ADEA claims.
as race, and the formal litigation claim alleges discrimination on a separate basis, such as sex.”); Cusack v. Delphi 
Corn,. 686 F. Supp. 2d 254, 258 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (dismissing Title VII claims where plaintiff only asserted ADA 
claims in EEOC charge); Tsai v. Rockefeller Univ., 137 F. Supp. 2d 276, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“A number of courts 
. . . have held that Title VII claims are not reasonably related to ADA claims.”); Peltier v. Apple Health Care, Inc., 
130 F. Supp. 2d 285, 292 (D. Conn. 2000) (dismissing ADA claim because it was not sufficiently related to the 
ADEA claim filed with the EEOC).
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dem onstrate that he suffers from  a disability. See id.; Fox v. Gen. M otors Corp., 247 F.3d 169,
177 (4th Cir. 2001) (setting out prim a facie elem ents o f  A D A  hostile w ork  environm ent claim); 
EEO C v. Stow e-Pharr M ills, Inc., 216 F.3d 373, 377 (4th Cir. 2000) (setting out prim a facie 
elem ents o f  A D A  disability discrim ination claim). The A D A  defines “ disability” w ith respect to 
an individual as “(A) a physical or m ental im pairm ent that substantially lim its one or m ore m ajor 
life activities o f  such individual; (B) a record o f  such an im pairm ent; or (C) being regarded as 
having such an im pairm ent . . . . ” 42 U .S.C. § 12102(1).9 In this case, p la in tiff appears to  be 
claim ing both that he has an actual disability and that the County perceived him  as being 
disabled. As a result, the court will consider both possible claims.
P la in tiff has failed to  allege facts w hich show that he suffers from  an actual disability.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). P la in tiff states that he is a stutterer and that he “understands that 
stuttering is a disability protected by the [A D A ].” (Compl. ^ 18.) The court disagrees w ith 
plaintiff’ s conclusory statement. The com plaint contains no allegations w hich dem onstrate that 
plaintiff’ s stutter substantially lim ited any m ajor life activity, such as w orking or 
com m unicating. See B ates v. W is.-Dept. o f  W orkforce Dev., 636 F. Supp. 2d 797, 809 (W.D. 
W is. 2009) (speech im pedim ent w hich allegedly caused claim ant to stutter did not qualify as 
disability under the AD A, given com plete lack o f  evidence that claim ant’s stuttering 
substantially lim ited any m ajor life activity), a f fd , 375 Fed. Appx. 633 (7th Cir. 2010). In fact, 
plaintiff’ s own allegations indicate that his physical condition did not lim it his ability to  w ork or 9
9 The current version of the ADA incorporates the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), Pub. L. 
No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). The ADAAA, which became effective on 1 January 2009, id. at 3559, applies 
to this case. In the ADAAA, Congress mandated that the definition of disability is to be construed “in favor of broad 
coverage of individuals . . . to the maximum extent permitted” by the law. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A). The court has 
taken the broad coverage of the ADAAA into account in ruling on the motion to dismiss.
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com m unicate. (See, e.g., Compl. ^  18 (“p lain tiff has a doctoral level education and has never 
used his stuttering as an excuse”), 33, 85.) Thus, p lain tiff has alleged no facts from  w hich the 
court can conclude that he has the requisite disability to  qualify him  for re lief under 42 U .S.C. § 
12102(1)(A).
The court will now  consider w hether p la in tiff has alleged sufficient facts to  show  that he 
w as “regarded as” having a disability. 42 U .S.C. § 12102(1)(C). “A n individual m eets the 
requirem ent o f  ‘being regarded as having such an im pairm ent’ i f  the individual establishes that 
he or she has been subjected to  an action prohibited under this chapter because o f  an actual or 
perceived physical or m ental im pairm ent w hether or not the im pairm ent lim its or is perceived to 
lim it a m ajor life activity .” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A). Here, other than the conclusory 
allegations contained in the com plaint w hich state that the County took adverse em ploym ent 
action against p la in tiff because he w as perceived to have a disability (Compl. ^  183, 211, 219), 
there are sim ply no facts in the com plaint w hich show that any o f  the relevant decision m akers in 
this case regarded p lain tiff as having an actual or perceived im pairm ent or that any o f  the 
decision m akers subjected him  to  action that is unlaw ful under the A D A  because o f  such an 
im pairm ent. As a result, p lain tiff cannot establish that a disability existed under 42 U .S.C. § 
12102(1)(C). A ccordingly, even under the m ost liberal pleading standard, p la in tiff has failed to 
state a discrim ination or hostile w ork environm ent claim  under the A D A .10
10 To the extent that plaintiff is attempting to assert a claim for wrongful discharge under the ADA, this 
claim fails for the same reasons as plaintiff’s ADA discrimination and hostile work environment claims. See, e.g., 
Ennis v. Nat’l Ass’n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 58 (4th Cir. 1995) (setting out prima facie elements of 
ADA wrongful discharge claim).
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E. State Law  Claim s A gainst All D efendants
All defendants have acknow ledged that p la in tiff has “ also m ade claim s for tw enty causes 
o f  action w hich he characterizes as ‘com m on law  claim s under applicable law .’” (D efs.’ M em. 
Supp. M ot. D ism iss at 18.) D efendants have m oved for dism issal o f  these claim s for lack o f 
subject m atter jurisdiction. A lthough defendants do not cite to  a specific statutory provision, it is 
apparent that they seek dism issal o f  the state law  claim s pursuant to  28 U .S.C. § 1367(c)(3), 
w hich provides that a d istrict court “m ay decline to  exercise supplem ental ju risd iction  over a 
claim  . . . i f  . . . the district court has dism issed all claim s over w hich it has original ju risd iction  .
. . .” This argum ent, how ever, is prem ised on the m istaken notion that the court w ould dism iss 
all o f  the federal claim s against all o f  the defendants, leaving no basis for federal subject m atter 
jurisdiction. H ow ever, because plaintiff’ s Title V II claim s against the County rem ain pending, 
the court has supplem ental ju risd iction  over plaintiff’ s state law  claim s against the County. See 
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
Furtherm ore, even though all o f  plaintiff’ s federal claim s against the individual
defendants have been dism issed, the individual defendants are not entitled to  dism issal o f
plaintiff’ s state law  claim s under 28 U .S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
Subsection (c)(3) requires that all claim s over w hich [a court] has original 
ju risd iction  m ust have been dism issed before a d istrict court m ay rely on that 
provision as a basis for dism issing the supplem ental claims. This refers to  all 
claim s in the case, no t ju s t those claim s asserted against a particular defendant. I f  
a defendant faces only state claim s, the court m ust exercise its supplem ental 
ju risd iction  over those claim s as long as claim s rem ain against o ther defendants 
for w hich original ju risd iction  is present.
16 M oore’s Federal Practice -  Civil § 106.66[1] (3d ed. 2000) (em phasis in original) (footnote 
om itted); see also, e.g., H ansen v. Bd. Trustees o f  H am ilton S.E. Sch. Corp., 551 F .3d 599, 608
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(7th Cir. 2008) (district court’s discretion to  relinquish ju risd iction  o f  state law  claim s against
defendant pursuant to  § 1367(c)(3) w as “never triggered” because the court still had original 
ju risd iction  over federal claim s against co-defendant); G udenkauf v. Stauffer C om m c’ns, Inc., 
896 F. Supp. 1082, 1084 (D. Kan. 1995) (“As long as one o f  the parties to  the suit has federal 
claim s pending against it, the court has m andatory supplem ental ju risd iction  over all claim s and 
parties related.”). H ow ever, p la in tiff is not entitled to  proceed w ith the state law  claim s against 
the B oard because the B oard is not a proper party to  this action. See Section II.A ., supra .
The County and the individual defendants have m ade no other argum ents regarding the 
state law  claim s, and at this early stage o f  the case, the court finds no com pelling reason to  split 
plaintiff’ s state law  claim s against the County and the individual defendants and litigate them  in 
separate forum s. A bsent m ore specific grounds for dism issal advanced by these defendants, the 
court w ill not decline to  exercise supplem ental ju risd iction  over plaintiff’ s state law  claim s.11 
W hether the state law  claim s are viable, adequately articulated, or sufficient to  survive 
subsequent m otions is unclear, and the court offers no opinion w ith respect to these issues as 
they have not been raised in the m otion to  dismiss.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the m otion to  dism iss is G RA N TED  IN  PA R T and D EN IED  
IN  PA RT. The Cum berland County B oard o f  Com m issioners is D ISM ISSED  from  this action. 
P lain tiff’s A D A  and A D EA  claim s (Counts I, II, III, V, and VI) are D ISM ISSED  W ITH O U T
11 If, at any time, plaintiff’s federal claims are dismissed entirely, the County and the individual defendants 
may renew their motion to dismiss on the grounds of supplemental jurisdiction or the court may address the issue sua
sponte.
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PR EJU D ICE. Plaintiff’ s Title V II claim s against the individual defendants are D ISM ISSED  
W IT H  PR EJU D ICE. P la in tiff m ay only proceed w ith his Title V II claim s against the County 
and w ith his state law  claim s against the County and the individual defendants. The C lerk is 
hereby D IR EC TED  to enter an O rder for D iscovery Plan.
This 25 July 2011.
W. Earl B ritt
Senior U.S. D istrict Judge
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